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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
Social Smartphone Apps Do Not Capture Attention 
Despite Their Perceived High Reward Value
Niklas Johannes*, Jonas Dora* and Dorottya Rusz*,†
Smartphones have been shown to distract people from their main tasks (e.g., studying, working), but the 
psychological mechanisms underlying these distractions are not clear yet. In a preregistered experiment 
(https://osf.io/g8kbu/), we tested whether the distracting nature of smartphones stems from their high 
associated (social) reward value. Participants (N = 117) performed a visual search task while they were 
distracted by (a) high social reward apps (e.g., Facebook app icon + notification sign), (b) low social reward 
apps (e.g., Facebook app icon), and (c) no social reward apps (e.g., Weather app icon). We expected that 
high social reward app icons would slow down search, especially when people were deprived of their 
smartphones. Surprisingly, high social reward (vs. low or no social reward) apps did not impair visual search 
performance, yet in a survey (N = 158) participants indicated to perceive these icons as more rewarding. 
Our results demonstrate that even if people perceive social smartphone apps as more rewarding than 
nonsocial apps, this may not manifest in behavior.
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Smartphones are thought to be pervasive sources of 
distractions, defined as performance decrements after the 
onset of task-irrelevant stimuli (Rusz, Bijleveld, & Kompier, 
2018). Indeed, increasing experimental evidence shows 
that smartphones impair cognitive performance (Chein, 
Wilmer, & Sherman, 2017). For instance, hearing a phone 
ring (Shelton, Elliott, Eaves, & Exner, 2009), receiving 
notifications (Stothart, Mitchum, & Yehnert, 2015), or even 
the mere presence of a smartphone (Thornton, Faires, 
Robbins, & Rollins, 2014; Ward, Duke, Gneezy, & Bos, 2017) 
had a negative effect on sustaining attention on a main 
task (but see also Johannes, Veling, Verwijmeren, & Buijzen, 
in press). In line with such an impairment in maintaining 
attention, Kushlev, Proulx, and Dunn (2016) found that 
people report more difficulties to concentrate on their 
tasks when they enable (vs. disable) notifications. Taken 
together, there is growing experimental evidence that 
smartphones appear to harm productivity. However, the 
underlying psychological mechanism of these performance 
decrements remains unknown. Understanding this 
mechanism is crucial, as it can advance theory on the 
effects of smartphones on performance and inform policy 
makers on how to deal with smartphone use, for instance 
in school or work contexts.
Previously, smartphone distractions have predominantly 
been explained as a stimulus-driven mechanism. From 
this perspective, impairments in performance happen 
because people are distracted by an external source (e.g., 
notifications, ringing phone). However, such a perspective 
does not explain why a smartphone notification should 
have a stronger effect than any other external stimulus 
(e.g., a loud tone). Instead, people are not only influenced 
by external cues, but also driven by current motivational 
states (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Therefore, beyond 
external sources, smartphone distractions can be explained 
by a motivational drive to seek social rewards.
In line with this idea, it is plausible that smartphones 
distract people from their tasks because they carry social 
reward to the user and the user is motivated to attain that 
reward despite disengaging from another task (Oulasvirta, 
Rattenbury, Ma, & Raita, 2012). According to Bayer, 
Campbell, and Ling (2015), because people have an innate 
need for social contact and belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000), they use the predominantly social 
features of smartphones such as WhatsApp or Facebook. 
Through repeatedly meeting their social needs on those 
apps, users form an association between social reward 
and their smartphones. Thus, users are first motivated to 
attain social rewards through their smartphones. Once 
this connection is established, smartphone cues, such 
as receiving a notification, may automatically attract 
attention and trigger checking habits. In sum, Bayer and 
colleagues (2015) assume that the distracting potential of 
smartphones is due to their rewarding nature.
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Although this account appears plausible, there are no 
direct tests of a smartphone cue-reward association. As of 
now, most research relies on indirect tests. For instance, 
there is evidence that smartphone symbols are associated 
with positive affect (van Koningsbruggen, Hartmann, 
Eden, & Veling, 2017) and can prime relationship-
related concepts (Kardos, Unoka, Pléh, & Soltész, 2018). 
Additionally, there is ample cross-sectional evidence 
demonstrating that users themselves report that they 
obtain social gratification from social apps (Ishii, Rife, & 
Kagawa, 2017; Jung & Sundar, 2018; Karapanos, Teixeira, 
& Gouveia, 2016). Thus, even though several studies have 
addressed the idea that smartphones are associated with 
high social rewards, there is no direct empirical test of this 
mechanism.
On a fundamental level, value-driven attention (for a 
review see Anderson, 2016) provides a well-established 
cognitive framework that can explain reward associations, 
including those with one’s smartphone. As people, by 
nature, are reward-seeking organisms (Braver et al., 
2014), attention prioritizes information that signals 
reward (Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 
2013). Recent work shows that this prioritization process 
operates even when information is entirely task-irrelevant, 
which leads to disengagement from the task at hand 
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a; Rusz et al., 2018). 
In a series of studies (Anderson et al., 2011a; Anderson, 
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011b; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & 
Beesley, 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012), participants 
first learned to associate an arbitrary stimulus feature 
(e.g., color) with high or low monetary rewards. Later, 
they engaged in a visual search task where these colored 
stimuli appeared as nontargets that needed to be ignored. 
Results show that distractors associated with high (vs. 
low) monetary rewards significantly slowed down visual 
search. This means that reward-associated distractors gain 
high attentional priority (i.e., become more salient) and 
therefore capture visual attention (Hickey, Chelazzi, & 
Theeuwes, 2010). This mechanism of learning to associate 
rewards with certain stimuli could explain how reward 
associations take place in smartphone settings.
Value-Driven Attention and Smartphone App 
Icons
Applying a value-driven attentional mechanism to 
a smartphone scenario, it is plausible that certain 
smartphone features (e.g., app icons) have been associated 
with social rewards through repeated use. Consequently, 
these features gain attentional priority and therefore 
attract attention and eventually harm visual search 
performance. As the major part of social interaction on 
smartphones happens via apps, we assume that app 
icons carry social reward to the user. For instance, social 
apps (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp), particularly with a 
notification sign, should be associated with high social 
reward, as notifications usually convey social validation, 
such as friends liking a picture or friend requests (Reich, 
Schneider, & Heling, 2018). Conversely, nonsocial apps 
(e.g., Weather, Calculator) should not carry social rewards 
as they are not used for social purposes. So, analogous to 
the value-driven attention account, we expect that social 
app icons should similarly attract attention and therefore 
slow down visual search. Therefore, we predict that low 
social reward distractors (social app icons) and high social 
reward distractors (social app icons with a notification) 
result in slower reaction times compared to no reward 
distractors (neutral app icons; H1a–b), and that high social 
reward distractors result in slower reaction times than low 
social reward distractors (H1c).
In addition, it is well-established that deprivation of 
rewarding experiences strengthens the motivation to 
obtain these experiences (Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007). 
For example, depriving participants of food led to a higher 
reinforcing value of the food compared to not hungry 
participants (Epstein, Truesdale, Wojcik, Paluch, & Raynor, 
2003). Similarly, it is common practice to assess the true 
value participants assign to food after a fasting period 
(e.g., Chen, Veling, Dijksterhuis, & Holland, 2016). In the 
case of smartphones, if social apps truly are rewarding, the 
appeal of social apps, similar to food, should be stronger 
for those who have been deprived of using these apps. 
Evidence for such a position comes from studies showing 
that phone separation is associated with strong emotional 
reactions (Hoffner & Lee, 2015), leads to anxiety (Cheever, 
Rosen, Carrier, & Chavez, 2014), impairs cognitive control 
(Hartanto & Yang, 2016), and results in physiological 
stress reactions (Clayton, Leshner, & Almond, 2015). 
Consequently, the reward value associated with app icons 
should be particularly high, and hence distracting, when 
participants are motivated to use these apps. We thus 
hypothesize that all main effects of distractor are stronger 
for users who have previously been deprived of their 
phones compared to a control group (H2).
This set-up enables us to exclude alternative explana-
tions: If we indeed find the expected pattern for distractor, 
(a) low and high social reward distractors might capture 
attention merely because the social apps are more 
familiar to participants, given that they are used more; 
(b) high social reward distractors might capture attention 
more than low social reward distractors because of the red 
color of the notification sign. Therefore, only if the effect 
is amplified in the deprivation condition can we conclude 
that apps indeed carry reward for users, above and beyond 
the possible effects of familiarity and color.
To test our hypotheses, we adapted the visual search 
task introduced in Anderson et al. (2011b). We chose this 
paradigm for two reasons. First, it is a well-established 
method to assess the effect of reward-associated distractors 
on attention (for reviews see Anderson, 2016; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & 
Wills, 2016). Second, the visual search task represents 
a good approximation of smartphone distractions in 
real life scenarios. For instance, consider a student who 
has to write a paper, but the Facebook notification sign 
repeatedly captures their attention.
We deviated from the original paradigm in two major 
aspects. First, we omitted the reward learning phase from 
the current study because we assumed that people learned 
to associate social rewards with smartphone app icons 
through repeated exposure in everyday life. Therefore, 
we only used the testing phase of the original paradigm. 
Second, in order to increase ecological validity, we used 
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smartphone app icons as distractors. By using real-life 
icons, we followed recent studies which show that more 
complex visual information, such as pictures of people 
or scenery, can also be associated with rewards (Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2015; Hickey, Kaiser, & Peelen, 2015).
Thus, in the current study, participants were instructed 
to find the target while they were distracted by app icons 
that were associated with high social rewards, low social 
rewards, or no social rewards. In the original paradigm, the 
rewarding nature of stimuli is reflected in impaired visual 
search. Consequently, the visual search task paradigm 
provides us with a test of the proposed smartphone-reward 
association: If social smartphone cues are indeed more 
rewarding than neutral smartphone cues, they, like other 
rewarding stimuli, should impair visual search. In other 
words, impaired visual search performance serves as an 
indicator of the reward associated with smartphone cues.
Study 1
Method
Preregistration and Data Availability
We preregistered hypotheses, sample size, inclusion 
and exclusion criteria, and statistical analyses. Our 
preregistration, experimental materials, data, and analysis 
are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.
io/g8kbu/).
Participants
As power calculations are not entirely straight-forward 
for linear mixed-effects models (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 
2008), we preregistered a rather conservative sample 
size. Therefore, we recruited 120 students from a 
Dutch university. We had four inclusion criteria: First, 
participants needed to have normal or corrected to 
normal vision. Second, students needed to own an iPhone. 
This ensured the icons we used as distractors would be 
identical to those that participants use on their iPhones 
every day. Icons are standardized across iOS compared to 
Android, where icons often differ between devices due 
to the open source nature of the Android OS. Third, as 
people under 25 report the highest smartphone use (CBS, 
2018; Pew Research Center, 2017), our participants had to 
be younger than 25 years. Fourth, participants had to have 
the five distractor apps Facebook, Facebook Messenger, 
Instagram, Snapchat, and WhatsApp installed on their 
iPhone and they had to be frequent users of these apps for 
at least two years. These criteria were meant to ensure that 
reward learning had taken place, that is, stimulus features 
had been paired with the delivery of (social) rewards (Le 
Pelley et al., 2016): Using these five social apps frequently 
plausibly has led to an established association of social 
rewards with visual features of these apps.
Following our preregistered exclusion criteria, we 
excluded three participants as they did not reach 70% 
accuracy on the task. Thus, the final sample consisted of 
117 students (59 in the control and 58 in the deprivation 
condition; 106 females, Mage = 20.85, SDage = 1.88). 
Participants were compensated with monetary rewards in 
the form of a gift voucher (€5 or €10) or course credits. 
The study had IRB approval and all participants gave 
informed consent.
Design
We employed a mixed design with deprivation as a between-
subject independent variable (2 levels: deprivation group 
vs. control group), app distractor icon as a within-subject 
independent variable (3 levels: high social reward vs. low 
social reward vs. no social reward) and response time (RT) 
as dependent variable.
Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to either the 
deprivation or the control condition. In the deprivation 
condition, we asked participants to come to the lab one 
hour before the experiment to hand in their iPhone, which 
we locked away in a drawer. Then, we told participants 
that they were free to go about their day within the next 
hour, but asked them not to engage in any social media 
activity until the experiment started. After one hour, they 
came back and performed the task (see below). After the 
task they received their phone. In the control condition, 
participants came to the lab at their assigned time slot 
and directly performed the task.
Before starting the task, participants reported 
demographics (age and gender). In order to assess whether 
our deprivation manipulation indeed led to an increased 
motivation to use their smartphones, participants then 
answered a short manipulation check on a 1 (not at all) 
to 100 (extremely) visual analogue scale (“Right now, to 
what extent do you feel an urge to check your phone?”). 
Then, they performed the visual search task. Finally, 
after finishing the task, participants reported a second 
manipulation check, namely whether they had seen 20 
apps (ten of which were used in the experiment) during 
the course of the visual search task. With this question, 
we tested whether participants actually processed the 
distractor app icons throughout the visual search task.
Visual Search Task
We designed a visual search task based on Anderson et 
al. (2011b). Participants were seated about 50 cm from a 
monitor with a resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels. On each 
trial, participants first saw a fixation cross with a visual 
angle of 0.5°, then six shapes organized in an imaginary 
circle with a visual angle of 10°; each shape had a visual 
angle of 3.45°; last, participants were presented with a 
performance feedback display (see Figure 1).
Among these six shapes, there was always one unique 
shape, which was defined as the target (i.e., a circle among 
diamonds or a diamond among circles). Each nontarget 
shape contained a black line tilted by 45°. The target shape 
always contained either a horizontal or vertical black line. 
On all trials, there was a distractor app icon embedded 
(1.73° visual angle) in one of nontarget shapes, on top of 
the tilted lines.
These distractor app icons represented three levels 
of social rewards (high, low, and no social rewards, see 
Figure 2). On the high social reward distractor trials (see 
Figure 2A), there was a social app icon with a notification 
sign (Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, 
WhatsApp, and Snapchat) within one of the nontarget 
shapes. We chose these apps because they are the most 
commonly used social apps. The red notification was 
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Figure 1: Trials in the experiment. Examples of (A) high social reward distractor trial, (B) low social reward distractor 
trial, and (C) no social reward distractor trial.
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identical to the one used on iOS. On the low social reward 
distractor trials (Figure 2B), there was a social app icon 
(i.e., same icons without the notification sign) within one 
of the nontarget shapes. As stated above, these apps are 
mainly used for social purposes – so we assumed they 
represent social reward to people, but less than these 
same apps with the certainty of a notification sign. Finally, 
on the no social reward distractor trials (Figure 2C), there 
was a neutral app icon (Weather, Settings, Notes, Clock, 
and Calculator) within the nontarget shapes. We chose 
these specific icons as they are pre-installed on every 
iPhone, so iPhone users most likely encounter them often 
enough; yet, they are never used for social purposes, so 
we assumed that participants could not have possibly 
associated social rewards with any of the neutral app 
icons. The target shape never included any distractors 
(i.e., icons). Target and distractor location were randomly 
determined; distractor app icon and the unique shape 
were counterbalanced.
Participants were instructed to search for the target, 
which was always defined as the unique shape in the search 
display, and report whether the line within the target shape 
was horizontal or vertical, by pressing the “z” and “m” keys 
(counterbalanced). The experiment consisted of 480 trials: 
120 trials (25%) contained a high social reward distractor, 
120 trials (25%) contained a low social reward distractor, 
and 240 trials (50%) contained a no social reward distractor. 
Before the task, participants did 24 practice trials. After 
each 96 experimental trials, participants could take a short 
break. The task took ~35 minutes to finish.
Data Analysis
We conducted all of our analyses in R (version 3.5.0, R Core 
Team, 2018). In line with our preregistration, we tested 
our hypotheses using a linear mixed-effects modeling 
approach using the lmer function (lme4 package; version 
1.1.17; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We aimed 
for a ‘maximal’ random effects structure as advocated by 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) to avoid inflated 
Type-1 errors. Accordingly, our model predicting response 
time included two random intercepts; a per-participant 
random intercept to account for the repeated-measures 
nature of the data and a per-app icon random intercept 
to account for any additional variance in response time 
caused by the specific app icons included in our study. We 
modeled the within-subject predictor distractor as fixed 
effect and as random slope varying across participants. We 
modeled the between-subject predictor condition as fixed 
effect and as random slope varying across app icons.
To determine p-values, we preregistered to compute 
Type III bootstrapped Likelihood Ratio Tests using the 
mixed function (afex package; version 0.20-2.; Singmann, 
Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 2018). However, this analysis led 
to several convergence warnings that persevered after the 
recommended troubleshooting steps. Thus, we followed 
recent recommendations by Luke (2017). Based on 
simulations, he compared several approaches to evaluating 
significance in mixed-effects models, and concluded that 
F-tests with Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of 
freedom are the most appropriate to control Type-1 error 
rates. Thus, we opted for this approach instead (also using 




Directly before starting the visual search task, participants 
in the deprivation condition reported a higher urge to 
check their smartphone (M  = 51.81, SD = 21.20) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 32.28, SD = 
27.15), t(111.44) = –4.39, p < .001, d = .80. At the end of 
the experiment, participants correctly classified whether 
or not they had seen 20 different app icons (ten of which 
we used as distractors) with an accuracy of 84%, indicating 
that they did process the distractors during the search 
task.
Figure 2: Stimuli used in the experiment. (A) social app icons with a notification sign represent high social rewards. (B) 
social app icons represent low social rewards. (C) neutral app icons represent no social rewards.
Johannes et al: Apps and AttentionArt. 14, page 6 of 13  
Preregistered Analyses
In line with our preregistration, we excluded any trial 
on which (a) the RT was below 300 ms (<0.01%) and (b) 
the RT was ±3 SDs from the participant’s mean (0.01%). 
For the analysis, we also excluded all inaccurate trials. 
Participants were accurate on 92% of the experimental 
trials. Across all remaining experimental trials from all 
participants (N = 51083) mean response time was 676.46 
ms (SD = 81.17).
The main effect of distractor was not significant, F(2, 
13.49) = 0.90, p = .428. Participants’ response time did 
not significantly differ between high social reward 
distractors (M = 678.82, SD = 83.11), low social reward 
distractors (M = 676.52, SD = 82.06), or no social reward 
distractors (M = 675.26, SD = 81.28). To our surprise, the 
main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 114.99) = 
4.00, p = .048. Overall, participants in the deprivation 
condition (M = 661.61, SD = 76.17) responded faster than 
participants in the control condition (M = 691.06, SD = 
83.88), irrespective of the type of distractor presented on 
any given trial. Last, the interaction effect of distractor and 
condition was not significant, F(2, 348.63) = 2.59, p = .076. 
To investigate whether there was indeed no interaction 
effect and to better understand our data, we tested the 
main effect of distractor in both conditions separately. 
The main effect of distractor was neither significant in the 
control condition, F(2, 16.54) = 1.18, p = .33, nor in the 
deprivation condition, F(2, 16.18) = 2.56, p = .11. Taken 
together, the effect of distractor did not significantly 
differ between the deprivation condition and the control 
condition. A visualization of the raw data associated with 
our analysis can be found in Figure 3.
Bayesian Follow-Up Analyses
A major limitation of our frequentist model is that it cannot 
quantify evidence for the null hypothesis. Therefore, to 
investigate to what extent our data support the lack of an 
effect, we conducted a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the anovaBF command (BayesFactor package; version 
0.9.12-2; Morey & Rouder, 2015). The model employed the 
default Cauchy distribution for the prior. The Bayes Factors 
associated with our predictors can be found in Table 1. 
Comparing a model with the main effect of condition to 
the null model yielded inconclusive evidence, as the data 
were 1.63 times more likely under the null model without 
the effect of condition (BF10 = 0.61). On the one hand, the 
Bayesian ANOVA does not allow an analysis as fine-grained 
as the frequentist mixed model, as it does not include a 
per-icon random intercept and random slope of condition. 
On the other hand, p-values close to the cut-off of α = .05 
often do not represent much evidential value (Benjamin et 
al., 2018), which is further illustrated by the Bayes Factor 
we obtained. The Bayesian analysis of the main effect thus 
shows that we should interpret the significant main effect 
of deprivation with caution.
Figure 3: Violin plots of response times per distractor and condition. Triangles represent mean response times (in ms).




Condition + Distractor 0.000777
Condition + Distractor + Interaction 0.000005
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In addition, supporting the nonsignificant effect of 
distractor, there was strong evidence that the data were 
much more likely under a null model compared to a model 
with the effect of distractor (BF01 = 755). The same holds for 
the interaction effect, which was not supported compared 
to a model with the two main effects (BF01 = 155).
Exploratory Analyses
In order to follow up on the unexpected main effect of 
condition, we investigated whether there was a speed-
accuracy tradeoff. A maximal generalized mixed-model with 
accuracy as the dependent variable did not show a significant 
effect of condition (χ2(1) = 0.0, p = .99). Supporting the lack 
of an effect, a Bayesian contingency table showed strong 
support for the lack of a difference between the conditions 
(BF01 = 167). We conclude that there was no speed-accuracy 
tradeoff, and that participants in the deprivation condition 
indeed performed better (faster while equally accurate).
Discussion
Contrary to our expectations, high social reward apps 
did not slow down visual search compared to low or no 
social reward apps, neither in the smartphone deprived, 
nor in the control condition. Based on prior work we 
assumed that different apps would have different levels 
of reward associated with them (e.g., Bayer et al., 2015; 
van Koningsbruggen et al., 2017). However, one possible 
explanation for this null effect is that social apps were 
not perceived as more rewarding than neutral apps. In 
fact, unlike in the original study series on value-driven 
attention, we did not directly manipulate stimulus-reward 
associations. In the original task, participants go through an 
extensive reward training, in which arbitrary stimuli, such 
as color, become associated with the delivery of monetary 
rewards. Consequently, these reward-associated stimuli 
slow down visual search; that is, impairment of visual 
search is an indicator of attentional capture by the reward 
of the stimuli. However, in our application of this paradigm 
we did not manipulate reward, but assumed the reward 
value of apps had been established in real life, through 
repeated use prior to the experiment. The lack of an effect 
on visual search speed might then either reflect that the 
stimuli are not rewarding, or that they are rewarding, but 
not rewarding enough to cause differences in attentional 
capture. Due to the design of Study 1, we cannot be certain 
that participants indeed perceived social apps as more 
rewarding than nonsocial apps. Therefore, we need to 
establish whether our reward manipulation was effective 
after all to rule out the alternative explanation that the app 
categories were not different in their associated reward.
To address this possible alternative explanation for the null 
effect of reward-associated distractors, we conducted a survey 
where participants rated all 15 apps we used during the 
experiment on how rewarding they found them. We expected 
that, if the three levels were truly to manipulate social reward, 
we should at least be able to detect a difference on how 
people themselves perceive these different apps. Accordingly, 
we hypothesized that high social reward apps would be rated 
higher than both low social reward apps and no social reward 
apps. In addition, we expected low social reward apps to 
receive higher ratings than no social reward apps.
Study 2
Method 
Preregistration and Data Availability 
We preregistered hypotheses, sample size, inclusion 
and exclusion criteria, and statistical analyses. The 
preregistration, experimental materials, data, and analysis 
are available on the Open Science Framework project of 
this article (https://osf.io/g8kbu/).
Participants 
Because we expected an experimental manipulation 
to induce at least a medium-sized effect (ηp
2 = .05) on 
a manipulation check, we aimed to obtain 95% power 
to detect an effect of at least that size at α = .05 for the 
main effect in a repeated-measures ANOVA. Thus, we 
preregistered to recruit 160 (150 needed for 95% power 
plus ten to account for exclusions) valid responses on the 
online platform Prolific. We counted those submissions as 
valid that passed an attention check (see below), as Prolific 
lets researchers resample participants if a participant fails 
an attention check.
We aimed to obtain a sample as similar as possible to 
our sample in Study 1. Overall, 252 participants from the 
UK between the ages of 18 and 25 opened the survey. All 
participants were screened and had to currently own an 
iPhone and have used an iPhone for at least the past two 
years. Furthermore, participants had to have the five social 
apps from Study 1 installed and had to have used them for 
at least the past two years. In addition to these inclusion 
criteria, we preregistered several exclusion criteria. First, 
52 participants were excluded because they did not finish 
the survey. Second, of the remaining 200, 40 did not pass 
an attention check (see Procedure). Third, we excluded 
two participants who indicated that they were older than 
prescreened by Prolific. No participant fulfilled our fourth 
exclusion criterion of having a variance of zero across all 
rated apps, or our fifth exclusion criterion of spending less 
than 30 total seconds on the 15 apps to rate (Mseconds = 72, 
SDseconds = 31). Thus, the final sample consisted of 158 
participants (Mage = 21.56, SDage = 2.40) of which 110 were 
female (70%).
Procedure 
Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to 
find out how people experience different apps. In particular, 
participants were informed that they were to rate different 
apps on how rewarding they find them. To make clear what 
we meant with rewarding, we provided several clarifications 
(e.g., feeling happy when using the app, feeling a strong need 
to use it, liking the app). To avoid participants overthinking 
their responses, we instructed them to respond promptly, 
based on their immediate thoughts about each app. To 
avoid confusion about the difference between a high social 
reward app (i.e., a social app with a notification sign) and a 
low social reward app (i.e., the same social app without a 
notification sign), we instructed participants that the apps 
would sometimes have a notification sign and that they 
should treat the app as if they saw it in that form on their 
own phone. Because understanding the task instructions 
was crucial to accurately rate the apps, we implemented 
two measures to ensure participants properly read the 
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instructions. First, going to the next page was only possible 
after 20 seconds. Second, at the end of the task description, 
we instructed participants to select “No” to proceed to the 
task as an attention check.
Participants then proceeded to rate all 15 stimuli used 
in Study 1 on the question “How rewarding do you find 
this app?” on a visual analogue scale ranging from –100 
(not at all) to 100 (very much). Presentation order of the 
apps was randomized. The entire survey, on average, took 
about three minutes (Mseconds = 185, SDseconds = 71) and 
participants received £0.50. The study had IRB approval 
and all participants gave informed consent.
Results 
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with app 
category (within: high social reward vs. low social reward 
vs. no social reward) as predictor and ratings of how 
rewarding participants found those apps as outcome. 
As the assumption of sphericity was violated (W = .30, 
p < .001), we report the F-statistic with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction. The main effect of category was significant and 
large, F(1.18, 184.75) = 150.77, p < .001, ηG
2 = .32. The 
strength of evidence for an effect of category was further 
supported by a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the standard Cauchy prior (BF10 = 1.63e + 107). To test our 
predicted contrasts we conducted three post-hoc two-tailed 
paired t-tests without correction for multiple testing, as 
correction for multiple testing is not necessary for designs 
with only one factor with three levels. We present paired 
Bayesian t-tests alongside the frequentist results.
In line with our predictions, high social reward apps 
(M = 36.99, SD = 33.18) received significantly higher 
ratings than low social rewards apps (M = 25.46, SD = 
34.31), t(157) = 7.61, p < .001, BF10 = 3.06e + 09, dz = 0.61, 
and significantly higher ratings than no social reward 
apps (M = –22.00, SD = 43.48), t(157) = 13.20, p < .001, 
BF10 = 1.15e + 24, dz = 1.05. In addition, low social reward 
apps received significantly higher ratings than no social 
reward apps, t(157) = 11.64, p < .001, BF10 = 7.36e + 
19, dz = 0.93. The residuals within each condition were 
roughly normally distributed and the results were robust 
to removal of outliers. A visualization of the raw data 
associated with our analysis can be found in Figure 4.
General Discussion
The goal of the current study was to test whether smart-
phone distractions stem from the high social rewards 
associated with smartphone apps. Participants engaged 
in a visual search task while they were distracted by 
smartphone app icons. Although we show that participants 
perceive social apps as more rewarding than neutral apps, 
that perceived reward did not impair performance in a 
visual search task. Also, depriving participants of their 
smartphone did not amplify such an effect. However, 
surprisingly, participants who were deprived of their 
smartphones performed better. In short, these results 
suggest that even if people perceive social apps as more 
rewarding than nonsocial apps, being exposed to these 
apps as distractors does not influence performance on a 
visual search task. However, there are several alternative 
Figure 4: Distribution of how rewarding participants rated the three categories of apps. Triangles represent mean 
 ratings.
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explanations, both theoretical and methodological, for 
our findings.
One possible alternative explanation for the lack of an 
effect of the three app groups is that participants did not 
perceive social apps as more rewarding than neutral apps. 
Instead of manipulating reward, as is common with the 
visual search paradigm, we assumed that users repeatedly 
obtain social validation and gratification from social apps 
(Karapanos et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2018), such that they 
would learn to associate social reward value with these apps. 
Therefore, we expected that social app icons, particularly 
those with a notification sign, gained their reward value 
in everyday life and should be as powerful as a controlled 
reward training phase in the lab. To provide evidence 
for this line of reasoning, Study 2 showed that people 
themselves report social apps to be more rewarding than 
neutral apps, especially if social apps have a notification 
sign. Importantly, the effect we obtained was large. As a 
consequence, we can be more confident that the lack of an 
effect is not due to a failed manipulation of reward.
That being said, there are several caveats to this objection 
which do not allow to draw a clear conclusion from our 
behavioral data regarding the reward value of apps. First, 
Study 1 and Study 2 were run on different samples, albeit 
matched on demographics. Technically, insights from the 
ratings in Study 2 might not apply to participants in Study 
1. In addition, although we show a difference in how the 
different app sets (i.e., high, low, and no social reward) 
are perceived, these ratings are relative to each other. We 
cannot be certain a social app with a notification sign does 
truly feel rewarding – or just more rewarding compared 
to a neutral app, which might not feel rewarding at all. 
As such, the relative difference in perceived reward value 
might not manifest itself on a behavioral level because, 
in absolute terms, the reward associated with apps is not 
large enough to attract attention (Potter, 2011).
Furthermore, we did not have a no-app control 
condition. Such a control condition would be informative 
by testing whether all apps, regardless of their perceived 
value, slow down visual search. Similarly, implementing a 
control condition with an arbitrary symbol (e.g., a symbol 
similar in shape to app icons) as distractor could provide 
a test whether app icons attract attention above and 
beyond any other distractor. This view aligns with the lack 
of an interaction between app icons and the deprivation 
manipulation. We predicted that social apps would be 
particularly distracting if users had been deprived to access 
them (Epstein et al., 2003; Seibt et al., 2007). Yet our data 
show that deprivation did not affect whether participants 
were more or less distracted by different apps. The lack 
of an interaction provides additional evidence for the 
explanation that perceived reward did not manifest itself 
on a behavioral level. Future research could consider using 
a no-reward control condition, an arbitrary symbol control 
condition, or even contrast apps with the low and high 
monetary reward condition used in the original paradigm 
(Anderson et al., 2011b) to test such a proposition.
Our findings echo work demonstrating that people’s 
perception about smartphones do not necessarily translate 
to behavior. For instance, Johannes et al. (in press) found 
that receiving a notification during a cognitive control task 
did not impair performance despite participants reporting 
to find the notification highly distracting. In a similar vein, 
other studies found that people are not good estimators 
of their own smartphone or internet use (Ellis, Davidson, 
Shaw, & Geyer, 2018; Scharkow, 2016). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that there might be a gap between 
what people themselves report about the distractions of 
their smartphones and the actual behavioral impairment 
these devices exert on them.
Our null findings have another potential explanation. 
In our experiment, we presented app icons in complete 
isolation from their usual context, which may have 
reduced their reward value altogether. Drawing from 
the theory of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2009), 
experiences are stored in people’s mind within a complex 
structure of sensory input, cognitions, affective states, 
and situational cues. It is possible that drawing a specific 
cue from such a rich, situated experience reduces the 
value of that cue. It is likely that it is only in their real-
life context that smartphone apps represent social reward, 
because context is part of the reward value-association. 
Consequently, participants might explicitly evaluate 
app icons as rewarding if there is no time pressure and 
they can imagine the icons within the context of their 
own phones, as in Study 2. In contrast, when these app 
icons get isolated from their real context in the lab, they 
may not affect attention (Best & Papies, 2017). Thus, the 
lab situation may not be appropriate for behaviorally 
measuring reward associations with smartphone apps. 
Supporting this reasoning, it has been shown that other 
types of rewards, such as food, are often stored in memory 
in terms of situations, for instance, where people eat them 
(e.g., popcorn is associated with cinema) and whom people 
eat those foods with (e.g., family events; Papies, 2013). 
Future research could address this issue by measuring 
smartphone distractions in their natural context, for 
example, on people’s own smartphones.
In sum, our results suggest that social app icons do not 
impair visual search. Given that social apps are rated as 
more rewarding outside of the lab, the lack of an effect of 
these apps on attention could be due to a loss of associated 
reward when taken out of context or insufficient absolute 
reward levels.
To our surprise, we found that participants who had 
locked away their phone an hour prior to the experiment 
were overall faster on the visual search task than participants 
who had not locked their phone away. However, this effect 
should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. 
First, we did not predict nor preregister a main effect of 
the deprivation condition. As such, the effect needs to be 
regarded as exploratory until independently replicated. 
Second, the p-value for the main effect of deprivation was 
extremely close to the alpha-level and many scholars argue 
that p-values of that size have limited evidential value 
(Benjamin et al., 2018). Our Bayesian analysis supports a 
need for caution regarding the effect, as the Bayes Factor 
in favor of the effect was inconclusive. Third, given the 
complexity to calculate power for our analysis, we cannot 
be certain we had sufficient power to detect a main 
Johannes et al: Apps and AttentionArt. 14, page 10 of 13  
effect. As a consequence, it is possible that our design was 
underpowered for the main effect, which is problematic 
for several reasons. Most important, underpowered 
studies that yield a significant estimate will necessarily 
overestimate the true effect size (Vasishth, Mertzen, 
Jäger, & Gelman, 2018). Thus, we can only reiterate that 
the surprising main effect of deprivation requires high-
powered, preregistered replication.
Last, we cannot exclusively attribute the effect to 
phone deprivation, as there was more than one difference 
between the non-deprived and the deprived group. 
Whereas participants in the non-deprived group came 
to the lab and immediately did the visual search task, 
participants in the deprived group came to the lab one 
hour earlier to lock away their phone and were free to 
do as they pleased during the one hour of deprivation, 
except for checking social media. Consequently, those 
deprived participants had one more contact point with 
the researchers and there was no control over what they 
did during the hour of deprivation. This difference might 
present an alternative explanation for the main effect: For 
instance, all participants were informed in the recruitment 
text for Study 1 that some of them might have to lock 
away their phone. Thus, at the point of locking away their 
phones participants in the deprived group could easily 
deduct that they were in the experimental condition. This 
knowledge might have induced reactance in the form 
of motivation to show that they could still perform well 
without their phones. Future research employing such 
a deprivation manipulation should consider having all 
participants come to the lab an hour prior to the task.
That being said, if we assume that the effect reflects 
a true difference between the conditions, regardless 
of possible confounding factors, it is plausible that 
locking participants’ smartphones away increased their 
motivation, which resulted in better performance. The 
idea that participants could get their smartphone back 
and access its social rewards when they were done with the 
task may have motivated them to perform faster. In other 
words, being able to check their social media and their 
messages after 1.5 hours may have acted as an incentive 
that they could receive at the end of the experiment 
(Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008). In line with such a 
view, participants in the deprivation condition indeed 
reported a higher urge to check their phones. Interestingly, 
this improvement in speed did not come at the cost of 
performance, as accuracy was almost identical across 
the two conditions. Such an interpretation corroborates 
the well-established idea that incentives boost cognitive 
performance (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Another account 
suggests that removing the smartphone as a distractor 
may have resulted in better performance, as smartphones 
have been shown to impede attention (Stothart et al., 
2015; Thornton et al., 2014; Ward et al., 2017).
Regardless of whether our data support a positive 
effect of deprivation or no effect, at the very least our 
findings stand in contrast to previous experiments, where 
participants who were separated from their phones 
performed worse on cognitive tasks (e.g., Hartanto & Yang, 
2016). These studies argue that smartphone separation 
increases anxiety (Cheever et al., 2014), which in turn 
leads to worse task performance. In light of these findings, 
our results are quite surprising and, when replicated, 
may have important implications. On the one hand, this 
apparent discrepancy might result from the difference in 
manipulations between studies. Whereas previous work 
deprived students of their phones strictly during the tasks, 
participants in our experiment were deprived both before 
and during the task. On the other hand, previous work 
also showed that anxiety due to phone separation rose 
with time (Cheever et al., 2014); if anything, increasing the 
deprivation duration should have had an even stronger 
negative effect on performance. Even taking into account 
our methodological concerns surrounding the effect 
of deprivation, there is a clear need for more research 
addressing this inconsistency. Doing so is of importance, 
as many policy makers, for example in schools, base their 
policies on findings demonstrating a detrimental effect of 
smartphones.
Overall, according to our findings, app icons are 
perceived as rewarding, but they do not capture attention 
and therefore do not distract participants from their task. 
Moreover, being deprived of access to these apps might 
not always be detrimental. However, these conclusions are 
constrained to our specific study design, which is subject 
to several possible alternative explanations. Our findings 
highlight that investigating media effects is complex 
and requires thorough designs that take the context of 
smartphone stimuli into account. As such, we believe that 
the current inconsistencies in the literature warrant more 
highly powered, preregistered research before making 
recommendations to policy makers.
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